If you have ever configured Windows NT Server or Windows 2000 Server, you may find that these Microsoft products are not the safest by default. Although Microsoft provides a lot of security mechanisms, you still need to implement them. However, when Microsoft released Windows Server 2003, it changed the previous philosophy. The new idea is that the server should be secure by default. This is indeed a good idea, but Microsoft has not implemented it thoroughly enough. Although the default Windows 2003 installation is definitely much safer than the Windows NT or Windows 2000 installation, there are still some shortcomings. Let's discuss how to make Windows Server 2003 more secure.
Understanding Your Role
Understanding server roles is an indispensable step in the security process. Windows Server can be configured into multiple roles. Windows Server 2003 can be used as a domain controller, member server, infrastructure server, file server, print server, IIS server, IAS server, terminal server, and so on. A server can even be configured as a combination of the above roles.
The problem now is that each server role has corresponding security requirements. For example, if your server will act as an IIS server, then you will need to turn on the IIS service. However, if the server will act as a standalone file or print server, enabling IIS services can be a huge security risk.
The reason I talked about this here is that I can't give you a set of steps that work in every situation. Server security should change as server roles and server environments change.
Because there are many ways to enhance the server, I will discuss the feasibility of configuring server security by configuring a simple but secure file server as an example. I will try to point out what you will do when the server role changes. Please understand that this is not a complete guide covering every role server.
Physical Security
To achieve true security, your server must be placed in a secure location. Typically, this means that the server will be placed behind the locked door. Physical security is quite important because many of the existing management and disaster recovery tools are also available to hackers. Anyone with such a tool can attack the server while physically accessing the server. The only way to avoid this type of attack is to place the server in a secure location. This is necessary for any role in Windows Server 2003.
Creating a baseline
In addition to building good physical security, the best advice I can give you is that when configuring a series of Windows Server 2003, you should be sure Your security needs strategies and deploy and implement them immediately.
The best way to do this is to create a security baseline. A security baseline is a list of documents and recognized security settings. In most cases, your baseline will vary depending on the server role. So you'd better create a few different baselines to apply them to different types of servers. For example, you can set a baseline for the file server, another baseline for the domain controller, and a baseline for the IAS server that is different from the previous two.
Windows 2003 includes a tool called "Security Configuration and Analysis." This tool allows you to compare the server's current security policy to the baseline security policy in the template file. You can create these templates yourself or use the built-in security templates.
Security Template is a series of text-based INF files, saved in %SYSTEMROOT%\\SECUR99vY|
Under the TEMPLATES folder. The easiest way to check or change these individual templates is to use the Management Console (MMC).
To open this console, enter the MMC command at the RUN prompt. After the console loads, select the Add/Remove Snap-in Properties command and Windows will display the Add/Remove Snap-in list. Click the "Add" button and you will see a list of all available snap-ins. Select the Security Templates snap-in, then click Add, then click the Close and Confirm buttons. & Amp; nbsp;
after the Security Templates snap-loaded, you can look at each of the security template. As you traverse the console tree, you'll find that each template mimics the structure of Group Policy. The template name reflects the purpose of each template. For example, the HISECDC template is a highly secure domain controller template.
If you are configuring a file server securely, I suggest you start with the SECUREWS template. When reviewing all the template settings, you will find that although the template can be used to make the server more secure, it may not meet your needs. Some security settings may be too strict or too loose. I suggest you modify your existing settings or create a new one. You can easily create a new template by right-clicking on the C:\\WINDOWS\\Security\\Templates folder in the console and selecting the New Template command from the target menu.
After creating a template that meets your needs, go back to the Add/Remove Snap-in Properties panel and add a snap-in for security configuration and analysis. After the snap-in is loaded, right-click on the "Security Configuration and Analysis" container, then select the "Open Database" command in the results menu and click the "Open" button. You can use the name you provided to create the necessary database.
Next, right click on the "Security Configuration and Analysis" container and select the "Import Template" command in the shortcut menu. You will see a list of all available templates. Select the template that contains your security policy settings and click Open. Once the template has been imported, right-click on the "Security Configuration and Analysis" container again and select the "Analyze Computer Now" command in the shortcut menu. Windows will prompt you to write the location of the error log, type the file path and click "OK".
In this case, Windows will compare the settings in the server's existing security settings and template files. You can see the comparison results through the "Security Configuration and Analysis Console". Each group policy setting displays existing settings and template settings.
When you can check the difference list, it's time to implement a template-based security policy. Right-click on the "Security Configuration and Analysis" container and select the "Configure Computer Now" command from the shortcut menu. This tool will immediately modify your computer's security policy to match the template policy.
Group Policy is actually hierarchical. Group Policy can be applied to the local computer level, site level, domain level, and OU level. When you implement template-based security, you are modifying the group policy at the computer level. Other group policies are not directly affected, although the final strategy may reflect changes as computer policy settings are inherited by higher level policies.
Modifying Built-in User Accounts
For many years, Microsoft has been emphasizing the best way to rename an Administrator account and disable the Guest account for greater security. In Windows Server 2003, the Guest account is disabled by default, but it is still necessary to rename the Administrator account, because hackers often start attacking from the Administrator account.
There are many tools to find the real name of an account by checking the SID of the account. Unfortunately, you can't change the user's SID, which means there's basically no way to prevent this tool from detecting the real name of the Administrator account. Even so, I encourage everyone to rename the Administrator account and modify the account description for two reasons:
First, the 诳 械 男 男 男 饫喙ぞ叩 饫喙ぞ叩 饫喙ぞ叩蛘卟 崾褂 浯 浯 浯 孛鸄 孛鸄 孛鸄 孛鸄 孛鸄 dministrator account for a unique name allows you to more easily monitor the attack of hackers on this account.
Another trick applies to member servers. Member servers have their own built-in local administrator account, completely independent of the administrator account in the domain. You can configure each member server to use a different username and password. If someone guesses your local username and password, you certainly don't want him to invade other servers with the same account. Of course, if you have good physical security, no one can use your local account to gain access to your server.
service account
Windows Server 2003 in a way to minimize the demand for the service account. Even so, some third-party applications still adhere to traditional service accounts. If possible, try to use a local account instead of a domain account as a service account, because if someone physically gains access to the server, he may dump the server's LSA secret and reveal the password. If you use a domain password, any computer in the forest can use this password to gain domain access. If you use a local account, the password can only be used on the local computer without any threat to the domain.
System Services
A basic principle tells us that the more code that runs on a system, the more likely it is to contain a vulnerability. An important security strategy you need to focus on is to reduce the code that runs on your server. Doing so can increase server performance while reducing security risks.
In Windows 2000, there are a lot of services running by default, but a large part of the service is not available in most environments. In fact, the default installation of Windows 2000 even includes a fully operational IIS server. In Windows Server 2003, Microsoft shut down most services that are not absolutely necessary. Even so, there are some controversial services that run by default.
One of the services is the Distributed File System (DFS) service. The DFS service was originally designed to simplify the user's work. DFS allows administrators to create a logical area containing resources for multiple servers or partitions. For users, all of these distributed resources exist in a single folder.
I personally like DFS, especially because of its fault tolerance and scalability. However, if you are not going to use DFS, you need to let the user know the exact path to the file. In some circumstances, this may mean greater security. In my opinion, the benefits of DFS outweigh the disadvantages.
Another such service is the File Replication Service (FRS). FRS is used to replicate data between servers. It is a mandatory service on the domain controller because it keeps the SYSVOL folder synchronized. For member servers, this service is not required unless DFS is running.
If your file server is neither a domain controller nor DFS, I recommend that you disable the FRS service. Doing so will reduce the possibility of hackers copying malicious files between multiple servers.
Another service that needs attention is the Print Spooler Service (PSS). The service manages all local and network print requests and controls all print jobs under these requests. All print operations are inseparable from this service, which is also enabled by default.
Not every server needs a print function. Unless the role of the server is a print server, you should disable this service. After all, what is the use of a dedicated file server to print a service? Normally, no one will work on the server console, so there should be no need to turn on local or network printing.
I believe that it is often necessary to print error messages or event logs during a disaster recovery operation. However, I still recommend simply turning off this service on a non-printing server.
Believe it or not, PSS is one of the most dangerous Windows components. There are countless Trojans that replace their executables. The motivation for this type of attack is because it is a unified service and therefore has a high privilege. So any Trojan that invades it can get these high-level privileges. In order to prevent such attacks, turn off this service.